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  Ryan	  Long*	  	  Mark	  White	  has	  developed	  a	  provocative	  skepticism	  about	  antitrust	  law.	  I	  first	  argue	  against	   three	   claims	   that	   are	   essential	   to	  his	   argument:	   the	   state	  may	   legitimately	  constrain	   or	   punish	   only	   conduct	   that	   violates	   someone’s	   rights,	   the	   market’s	  purpose	   is	  coordinating	  and	  maximizing	   individual	  autonomy,	  and	  property	  rights	  should	  be	  completely	   insulated	   from	  democratic	  deliberation.	   I	   then	  sketch	  a	   case	  that	   persons	  might	   have	   a	   right	   to	   a	   competitive	  market.	   If	   so,	   antitrust	   law	  does	  deal	   with	   conduct	   that	   violates	   rights.	   The	   main	   thread	   running	   throughout	   the	  article	   is	   that	  what	   counts	   as	   a	   legitimate	   exercise	   of	   property	   rights	   is	   dynamic,	  sensitive	   to	   various	   external	   conditions,	   and	   is	   the	   proper	   object	   of	   democratic	  deliberation.	  	  
I.INTRODUCTION	  	  Mark	  White	  has	  developed	  a	  provocative	  skepticism	  about	  antitrust	  law.1	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  three	  parts	  of	  his	  argument:	  	   1. The	   state	   may	   legitimately	   constrain	   or	   punish	   only	   conduct	   that	   violates	  someone’s	  rights.	  2. The	  market’s	  purpose	  is	  coordinating	  and	  maximizing	  individual	  autonomy.	  3. Property	   rights	   should	   be	   completely	   insulated	   from	   democratic	  deliberation.	  	  I	  will	  defend	  antitrust	  law	  by	  providing	  counter-­‐arguments	  to	  each	  of	  these	  claims.	  I	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  granting	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  does	  not	  entail	  White’s	  skepticism.	  	  	  
II.	  HARMS	  AND	  WRONGS	  
	  
A.	  Legitimate	  constraint	  	  White	   assumes	   that	   the	   state	   may	   legitimately	   constrain	   only	   conduct	   that	   is	  wrongful.	   Merely	   harmful	   conduct	   should	   not	   be	   constrained.	   Wrongs	   are	   then	  defined	   in	   terms	   of	   rights	   violations.	   Thus	   the	   coercive	   power	   of	   the	   state	   should	  only	   constrain	   conduct	   that	   violates	   some	   person’s	   rights.	   Compare	   this	   to	   Mill’s	  harm	  principle,	  which	  may	  also	  constrain	  and	  punish	  conduct	  that	  is	  “prejudicial	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  others.”2	  White’s	  principle	  is	  narrower,	  since	  not	  all	  harms	  are	  rights	  violations.	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   contrasts	   his	   principle	   with	   welfare	   utilitarianism	   and	   rejects	   the	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   individual	  rights	  trump	  welfarist	  concerns.	  White	  does	  not	  consider	  other	  options.	  Note	   that	  most	   legal	   systems	  constrain	  some	  conduct	   for	   rationales	  that	   are	   neither	   rights-­‐based	   nor	   utilitarian.	   Prohibitions	   of	   public	   nudity	   here	   in	  Philadelphia	   are	   not	   based	   on	   rights	   or	  welfare	   rationales,	   but	   rather	   community	  standards.	  The	  American	   legal	   system	  does	  not	  affirm	  Mill’s	  harm	  principle,	  much	  less	  White’s	  narrower	  principle.	  There	  may	  be	  alternative	  justifications	  of	  antitrust	  that	  are	  not	  addressed	  in	  White’s	  analysis.	  	  	  My	   first	   worry	   about	   White’s	   view	   is	   that	   one	   cannot	   resolutely	   hold	   the	  principle	   that	   only	   wrongs	   may	   be	   constrained.	   Acts	   that	   are	   not	   wrongs	   could	  collectively	   cause	   so	  much	   harm	   that	   life	  would	   become	  miserable	   or	   impossible.	  Mill’s	   approach	   is	   better	   suited	   to	   handle	   this	   problem.	   	   Rather	   than	   accept	   the	  wider	  form	  of	  Mill’s	  harm	  principle,	  White	  transitions	  from	  the	  claim	  that	  rights	  are	  trumps	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	   legitimate	  constraint	  may	  only	  address	  conduct	  that	  violates	  rights.	  But	  even	  if	  you	  accept	  the	  view	  that	  rights	  are	  trumps,	  and	  take	  this	  as	  a	  reason	  to	  reject	  welfare	  utilitarianism,	  you	  are	  not	  committed	  to	  the	  view	  that	  everything	  reduces	   to	  rights.	  Rawls	  argued	   that	   the	   liberty	  principle	   (dealing	  with	  rights)	   always	   takes	   priority	   over	   welfare	   utilitarian	   reasoning,	   and	   that	   welfare	  maximizing	   policies	   must	   never	   trump	   the	   inviolability	   of	   the	   person.3	  Yet	   Rawls	  does	   not	   end	   up	   with	   a	   view	   that	   restricts	   legitimate	   constraint	   to	   conduct	   that	  violates	   individual	  rights.	  Even	   if	  welfare	  utilitarianism	  fails	   to	  adequately	  account	  for	   individual	   rights,	   the	   conclusion	   that	   everything	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   rights	  does	  not	  immediately	  follow.	  	  One	  may	  also	  object	  that	  wrongs	  cannot	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  rights.	  Certain	  sorts	   of	   conduct,	   such	   as	   callous	   disregard,	  might	   count	   as	  wrongs	   even	  when	  no	  rights	  are	  violated.	  Unwarranted	  cruelty	  to	  one’s	  parents	  wrongs	  them	  but	  does	  not	  violate	  their	  rights.	  	  	  
B.	  Mere	  harms	  	  White	  uses	  traffic	  congestion	  pricing	  to	  highlight	  the	  difference	  between	  wrongs	  and	  mere	  harms.	  “While	  such	  policy	  interventions	  may	  increase	  aggregate	  welfare,	  they	  address	   harms	   and	   behavior	   that	   were	   not	   wrongful	   and	   did	   not	   merit	   policy	  attention	  to	  correct.”4	  But	  congestion	  pricing	  can	  be	  understood	  solely	  as	  a	  market	  force	   rather	   than	   a	   sanction	   or	   constraint	   on	   behavior.	   As	   demand	   increases,	   the	  value	  of	  the	  resource	  increases.	  The	  increased	  demand	  can	  lower	  aggregate	  welfare	  and	   increase	   the	   cost	   of	   maintaining	   the	   resource.	   Congestion	   pricing	   has	   the	  consumer	   of	   the	   resource	   pay	   the	   bill.	   It	   is	   therefore	   not	   clear	   that	   we	   should	  understand	  this	  issue	  in	  terms	  of	  sanctions	  and	  constraints.	  White	   then	   extends	   this	   analysis	   into	   a	   general	   skepticism	   about	   antitrust	  law,	  which	  targets	  behavior	  that	  he	  thinks	  is	  harmful	  but	  not	  wrongful.	  Firms	  harm	  consumers	   in	   many	   ways	   that	   do	   not	   involve	   trusts:	   raising	   prices	   unilaterally,	  changing	  products,	  or	  ceasing	  production	  of	  products.	  Neither	  these	  harms	  nor	  the	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   by	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   so	   why	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   out	   the	   harms	   of	   trusts	   for	  special	  civil	  and	  criminal	  enforcement?	  Why	  are	  these	  other	  harms	  less	  regulated?	  White	  thinks	  these	  are	  all	  mere	  harms,	   that	  all	  should	  be	  treated	  equally,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  accomplish	  this	  by	  rejecting	  antitrust	  regulation.	  In	  response,	  I	  will	  first	  argue	  that	  these	  harms	  are	  not	  all	  on	  par,	  then	  argue	  that	  trusts	  might	  in	  fact	  violate	  rights.	  These	  non-­‐trust	  harms	  cited	  by	  White	  create	  long	  term	  market	  opportunities	  for	   another	   firm	   to	   undercut	   the	   new	   price	   or	   to	   satisfy	   the	   demand	   for	   the	  discontinued	   product.	   The	   harms	   of	  monopolistic	   trusts	   do	   not	   allow	   (or	   at	   least	  hinder)	   these	  market	   responses,	   and	   therefore	   are	   a	  more	   serious	   form	   of	   harm,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  violate	  rights.	  The	  market	  can	  repair	  the	  first	  sort	  of	  harms,	  and	  indeed	   the	   proponents	   of	   free	  markets	   see	   these	   short-­‐term	  harms	   as	   part	   of	   the	  free	  market	   ideal.	  The	  market	  cannot	   in	   the	  same	  way	  repair	  harms	  of	   the	  second	  sort,	  which	  undermine	  the	   free	  market	   ideal.	  White	  treats	   these	  as	  on	  par,	  but	   the	  harms	  caused	  by	   trusts	  do	  not	  amount	   to	  any	   long-­‐term	  good	   for	  any	  party	  other	  than	  the	  trust	  itself.	  They	  cause	  an	  entirely	  different	  sort	  of	  harm	  that	  is	  not	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  good	  and	  is	  antithetical	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  market.	  	  White	   concludes	   that	   because	   the	   harms	   of	   trusts	   do	   not	   violate	   rights,	  antitrust	   constraints	   and	   sanctions	   are	   illegitimate.	   I	   have	   expressed	   skepticism	  about	  his	  principle	  that	  only	  wrongs	  may	  be	  constrained	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  harms	  caused	  by	  trusts	  are	  different	  from	  other	  sorts	  of	  harms	  caused	  by	  firms.	  Now	  let	  us	  examine	   what	   follows	   if	   White	   is	   correct	   that	   antitrust	   law	   is	   just	   only	   if	   trusts	  violate	   rights.	   Perhaps	  White	   does	   not	   identify	   the	   offended	   rights	   because	   he	   is	  looking	   at	   things	   in	   too	   fine	   detail:	   a	   right	   to	   a	   specific	   product,	   or	   a	   right	   to	   a	  product	  at	  a	  specific	  price,	  or	  a	  right	  to	  determine	  precisely	  how	  firms	  set	  prices.	  He	  is	   correct	   that	   consumers	   generally	   have	   no	   such	   rights.	  What	   about	   a	   right	   to	   a	  competitive	  market?	  White	  mentions	  this	  possibility	  but	  dismisses	  it.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  answer.	   If	   so,	  White’s	   principle	   does	   not	   entail	   skepticism	   about	   antitrust	   law.	   To	  evaluate	  this	  option	  we	  must	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  property	  rights	  and	  White’s	   claim	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   market	   is	   to	   coordinate	   and	   maximize	  autonomy.	  	  	  
II.THE	  PURPOSE	  OF	  THE	  MARKET	  
	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  antitrust	  violates	  rights	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  market	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   property	   rights.	   White	   argues	   that	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	  market	   is	   to	   coordinate	   actions	   and	   maximize	   autonomy.	   “[T]he	   market	   is	   best	  regarded	  as	  a	  coordinating	  mechanism	  that	  ensures	  that	  individuals	  have	  the	  most	  freedom	  to	  pursue	   their	   interests	  consistent	  with	  all	  other	  doing	   the	  same.	   In	   this	  view	   the	  market	   is	  not	  a	  guarantor	  of	  prosperity	  or	  wealth	  but	  a	  process	   through	  which	  multiple	   individuals’	   choices	  may	  be	   coordinated.”5	  This	   leaves	  us	  with	   two	  problems.	   First,	   a	  market	  may	   be	   constituted	   such	   that	  most	   agents’	   autonomy	   is	  frustrated.	   Second,	   the	   norm	   is	   to	   enter	  markets	  without	  making	   an	   autonomous	  choice.	   The	   circumstances	   of	   one’s	   birth	   typically	   determine	   the	   market	   within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  White,	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  note	  1.	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  version) which	  one	  exerts	  autonomy.	  Emigration	  does	  not	  solve	  this	  objection	  since	  it	  is	  not	  available	   to	   all,	   and	   the	   world	  may	   be	   constituted	   such	   that	   no	   available	   market	  furthers	  autonomy.	  If	   maximizing	   autonomy	   is	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   market,	   but	   we	   do	   not	   enter	  markets	  autonomously,	  perhaps	  we	  should	  recognize	  hypothetical	  conditions	  on	  the	  market.	  Is	  a	  given	  market	  such	  that	  one	  would	  freely	  enter	  into	  it?	  A	  rational	  agent	  who	   is	   convinced	   that	   capitalism	   is	   the	  best	  way	   to	  organize	   the	  market,	  but	  who	  lacks	  knowledge	  of	  his	  peculiar	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages,	  will	  only	  choose	  to	  enter	  a	  market	  that	  is	  competitive,	  or	  at	  least	  is	  the	  most	  competitive	  of	  the	  available	  options.	   A	   noncompetitive	  market	   is	   fundamentally	   at	   odds	  with	   this	   view	   of	   the	  function	  of	  markets	  and	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy.	  This	  means	  that	  only	  a	  competitive	  market	   satisfies	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   market,	   and	   thus	   agents	   have	   a	   right	   to	   a	  competitive	   market.	   Indeed,	   White	   treats	   firms	   as	   persons,	   and	   we	   can	   run	   this	  argument	   from	   the	   firm’s	   perspective.	   If	   a	   firm	   does	   not	   know	  whether	   it	   (or	   its	  competitors)	  are	   in	  a	  position	  to	  engage	   in	  monopolistic	  conduct,	   it	  would	  only	  be	  rational	  to	  enter	  a	  competitive	  market.	  	   Also	   note	   that	   White’s	   rejection	   of	   the	   welfare-­‐maximization	   view	   of	   the	  market	   does	   not	   automatically	   mean	   the	   market	   has	   no	   other	   purpose	   than	  furthering	  autonomy.	  Again,	  Rawls	   rejects	  welfare	  maximization	  but	  does	  not	   end	  up	  with	  White’s	   view.	   Rawls	   combines	   a	   rights-­‐as-­‐trumps	   view	  with	   thinking	   the	  market	   has	   the	   purpose	   of	   making	   all	   better	   off	   while	   maximizing	   the	   absolute	  condition	  of	  the	  worst-­‐off.	  The	  basic	  structure	  of	  the	  state	  should	  be	  designed	  such	  that	  the	  market	  serves	  this	  purpose.	  	  White	   also	   argues	   that	   a	   market	   cannot	   have	   another	   purpose	   because	   no	  persons	   or	   firms	   have	   an	   obligation	   to	   pursue	   that	   purpose.	   This	   issue	   requires	  more	  analysis.	  White’s	  general	   idea	   is	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  market	  cannot	  be	  to	  maximize	   aggregate	  welfare	   since	  no	  person	   is	   obligated	   to	   act	   in	   a	  way	   that	  will	  contribute	   to	   that	   purpose.	   Yet	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   the	  market	   having	   a	   particular	  purpose	  entails	  that	  anyone	  is	  obligated	  to	  have	  all	  their	  actions	  serve	  that	  purpose.	  Rawls	  argues	  that	  the	  market	  has	  the	  purpose	  just	  described,	  but	  no	  person	  has	  an	  obligation	  to	  pursue	  that	  purpose.	  The	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  should	  ensure	  that	  the	   market	   serves	   this	   purpose	   while	   individuals	   may	   make	   economic	   decisions	  based	  on	  their	  self-­‐interest.	  Without	  an	  additional	  argument	  we	  need	  not	  accept	  the	  claim	   that	   for	   the	   market	   to	   have	   a	   specific	   purpose	   other	   than	   maximizing	  autonomy,	  specific	  persons	  must	  be	  obligated	  to	  further	  that	  purpose.	  	  
III.PROPERTY	  RIGHTS	  	  White	   also	   argues	   that	   property	   rights	   must	   be	   completely	   insulated	   from	  democratic	   deliberation.	  He	   sees	   antitrust	   law	   as	   a	  misuse	   of	   democratic	   political	  power	   that	   illegitimately	   constraints	   the	   exercise	   of	   property	   rights.	   This	   is	  unacceptable	  because	  rights	  should	  be	   trumps;	  deliberation	  among	  the	  population	  about	   how	   to	   maximize	   welfare	   (or	   any	   other	   concern)	   cannot	   violate	   property	  rights.	  Therefore	  the	  state	  has	  no	  authority	  to	  limit	  property	  rights,	  even	  when	  they	  are	  exercised	  in	  a	  way	  that	  hinders	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  market.	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  version) However,	  this	  insulation	  is	  impossible.	  There	  are	  questions	  about	  the	  precise	  nature	   of	   property	   rights	   that	   cannot	   be	   answered	   solely	   by	   a	   priori	   analysis	   or	  empirical	  investigation.	  The	  problem	  is	  not	  that	  property	  rights	  must	  be	  subject	  to	  democratic	   deliberation	   because	   they	   only	   come	   into	   being	   within	   a	   particular	  political	  structure.	  Grant	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  Locke	  was	  correct.	  Property	  rights	  pre-­‐date	   civil	   society	  and	  originate	   in	   the	   state	  of	  nature.6	  Nonetheless,	   in	  a	  democracy,	  property	  rights	  must	  be	  subject	  to	  democratic	  deliberation.	  	  White	  objects	   that	  democratic	   legislatures	  may	  not	   constrain	  non-­‐wrongful	  exercises	  of	  property	  rights.	   “If	   that	  behavior	   is	  a	   legitimate	  exercise	  of	  rights	   that	  causes	  no	  wrongful	  harms	  to	  consumers	  or	  other	  firms,	  it	  is	  irrelevant	  whether	  that	  behavior	  is	  socially	  undesirable	  or	  disliked	  by	  the	  majority-­‐-­‐-­‐it	  should	  be	  protected	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  right	  and	  justice.”7	  I	  have	  already	  expressed	  skepticism	  that	  wrongful	  harms	  must	   always	   be	   rights	   violations.	  Now	   I	  will	   argue	   that	  what	   qualifies	   as	   a	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  rights	  requires	  democratic	  deliberation.	  	  In	  colonial	  Massachusetts,	   the	   legitimate	  exercise	  of	  property	  rights	  did	  not	  include	  the	  unlimited	  right	  to	  exclude	  hunters	  from	  your	  land.	  There	  was	  a	  conflict	  between	   the	   right	   of	   the	   property	   owner	   to	   control	   access	   and	   the	   right	   of	   the	  people	  to	  harvest	  a	  public	  resource.	  On	  this	  conception	  of	  property	  rights,	  hunters	  had	  some	  access	  to	  private	  land.	  That	  is	  not	  the	  conception	  of	  property	  in	  all	  times	  and	   places.	   Different	   jurisdictions	   define	   property	   rights	   differently.8	  The	   right	   of	  the	  property	  owner	  to	  exclude	  others	  from	  the	  land	  is	  not	  the	  same	  in	  all	  countries,	  nor	   is	   it	   the	   same	   across	   the	   United	   States.	   Different	   jurisdictions	   grant	   different	  rights	   of	   access.	   But	   if	   property	   rights	   are	   not	   proper	   objects	   of	   democratic	  deliberation,	  most	   of	   these	   jurisdictions	   are	  wrong	   about	   property	   rights.	   That	   is	  implausible	   because	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   more	   than	   one	   correct	   answer	   to	   this	  conflict.9	  	  A	  libertarian	  can	  object	  that	  limiting	  the	  property	  owner’s	  right	  of	  exclusion	  is	   always	  wrong.	  Property	   rights	   entail	   absolute	   rights	  of	   exclusion-­‐-­‐-­‐there	   is	  only	  one	  right	  answer,	  and	  it	  is	  that	  no	  form	  of	  exclusion	  is	  prohibited.	  This	  again	  seems	  implausible.	  I	  cannot	  cross	  your	  property	  to	  save	  a	  life?	  To	  stop	  a	  fire	  that	  threatens	  my	  property?	  To	  escape	  a	  natural	  disaster	  that	  threatens	  my	  life?	  To	  access	  the	  only	  local	  water	  resource?	  The	   intuitions	  behind	  those	   forms	  of	  access	  are	  as	  strong	  as	  any	   intuition	   behind	  property	   rights.	   	   Still,	   suppose	   that	   there	   is	   only	   one	   correct	  answer	  with	  respect	   to	  access,	  and	   that	  property	   rights	  allow	   for	  exclusion	   in	  any	  and	  all	  cases.	  	  Even	   if	   the	   libertarian	   is	   view	   is	   correct	   and	   property	   rights	   include	   an	  absolute	  right	  of	  exclusion,	  this	  does	  not	  settle	  the	  question	  of	  the	  spatial	  extension	  of	  that	  right.	  How	  far	  does	  shoreline	  property	  extend?	  How	  far	  do	  air	  rights	  extend?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  JOHN	  LOCKE,	  SECOND	  TREATISE	  ON	  CIVIL	  GOVERNMENT	  (ch.	  5)	  (1689).	  7	  White,	  supra	  note	  1.	  8	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Dan	  Brudney	  for	  discussion	  on	  this	  point.	  9	  You	  can	  accept	  Locke’s	  view	  and	  conclude	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  inviolable	  without	  concluding	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  ownership	  are	  inviolable.	  Indeed,	  all	  forms	  of	  ownership	  cannot	  be	  inviolable,	  and	  thus	  in	  a	  democratic	  state,	  democratic	  deliberation	  must	  define	  the	  borders	  of	  legitimate	  property	  rights.	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  the	  previous	  case	  the	  libertarian	  had	  a	  move	  to	  make.	  I	  think	  that	  move	  is	  wrong,	  but	   it	   is	   coherent.	  These	  questions	  provide	  no	   such	  move.	  These	   issues	   cannot	  be	  settled	   a	   priori,	   they	   cannot	   be	   settled	   by	   any	   straightforward	   empirical	  investigation,	  and	  must	  be	  determined	  politically.	  Thus	  the	  absolute	  prohibition	  on	  democratic	  deliberation	  over	  property	  rights	  must	  be	  rejected.	  White	   then	   objects	   that	   antitrust	   law	   makes	   property	   rights	   variable	   and	  dynamic	  according	  to	  background	  conditions	  and	  the	  acts	  of	  others.10	  Aside	  from	  his	  principle	  that	  democratic	   legislatures	  should	  not	   interfere	  with	  property	  rights,	  he	  thinks	   that	   the	  way	   antitrust	   law	  makes	  property	   rights	  dynamic	   and	   sensitive	   to	  the	  acts	  and	  holdings	  of	  other	  persons	   is	   illegitimate.	  He	  thinks	  owners	  may	  do	  as	  they	  wish	  with	  their	  property,	  and	  that	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  legitimate	  exercise	  of	  their	  property	   rights	   is	  defined	   independently	  of	   the	  holdings	  and	  acts	  of	  other	  parties.	  “Under	   the	   classical	   conception	   of	   property	   rights,	   [consumers]	   have	   no	   right	   to	  interfere	  with	  the	  terms	  by	  which	  firms	  choose	  to	  dispose	  of	  their	  property.”11	  	  But	   in	   the	   Lockean	   conception,	   certain	   forms	   of	   use,	   hoarding,	   or	   disposal	  invalidate	   one’s	   property	   rights.	   Legitimate	   exercise	   does	   not	   include	   everything	  that	  a	  property	  owner	  may	   freely	  choose	   to	  do	  with	  her	  property.	  Property	  rights	  are	  dynamic	  and	  sensitive	  to	  the	  holdings	  and	  acts	  of	  other	  persons.	  Locke	  argued	  that	  property	  rights	  are	  always	  variable	  by	  the	  “enough	  and	  as	  good”	  condition.	  In	  the	  state	  of	  nature,	  a	  person	  may	  appropriate	  unowned	  resources	  by	  mixing	   them	  with	   their	   labor.	   But	   they	   must	   leave	   enough	   and	   as	   good	   for	   others.	   Since	   the	  definition	  of	  “enough	  and	  as	  good”	  varies	  according	  to	  the	  resources	  available	  and	  the	  holdings	  of	  other	  parties,	  Lockean	  property	  rights	  are	  dynamic	  from	  their	  origin.	  Locke	  also	  thought	  that	  property	  rights	  varied	  by	  whether	  a	  market	  uses	  barter	  or	   currency.	   Without	   currency,	   hoarding	   that	   leads	   to	   spoilage	   is	   not	   part	   of	   his	  conception	  of	   the	   legitimate	   exercise	  of	  property	   rights.	   In	   a	   currency	   system	  one	  can	  hoard	  without	  spoilage,	  and	  that	  constraint	  is	  therefore	  lifted.	  So	  even	  within	  a	  classical	  conception	  of	  property	  rights,	   indeed	  one	  that	  has	  been	  hugely	  influential	  to	   libertarian	   thought,	   what	   counts	   as	   a	   legitimate	   exercise	   of	   property	   rights	   is	  dynamic	   and	   sensitive	   to	   external	   conditions.	   It	   is	   also	   worth	   noting	   that	   Locke	  reached	   this	   position	   because	   he	   thought	   that	   property	   (and,	   by	   extension,	   the	  market)	   has	   the	   purpose	   of	   increasing	   the	   fruitfulness	   of	   the	   world	   and	   thereby	  increasing	   human	   welfare.	   The	   purpose	   is	   not	   merely	   to	   maximize	   individual	  autonomy.	  	  	  
IV.	  CONCLUSION	  	  I	   raised	   several	   objections	   to	   White’s	   anti-­‐antitrust	   argument.	   I	   objected	   to	   the	  principle	  that	  the	  state	  can	  only	  legitimately	  constrain	  conduct	  that	  violates	  rights,	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  property	  rights	  must	  be	  insulated	  from	  democratic	  deliberation,	  and	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  market	  has	  no	  purpose	  other	  than	  maximizing	  and	  coordinating	  individual	  autonomy.	  I	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  harms	  caused	  by	  trusts	  are	  different	  in	  kind	   from	   the	   other	   harms	   caused	   by	   firms.	   I	   sketched	   a	   case	   that	   persons	  might	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  White,	  supra	  note	  1.	  11	  White,	  supra	  note	  1.	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  therefore	  trusts	  do	  violate	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  The	  main	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  throughout	  the	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  of	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